Cable sobre las dudas de militares bolivianos de la lealtad de sus fuerzas

En diciembre de 2007 la Embajada informa que algunas unidades de Ejército reciben pagos de Venezuela

ID: 134536

Date: 2007-12-14 23:21:00



Origin: 07LAPAZ3262

Source: Embassy La Paz

Classification: SECRET

Dunno: 07LAPAZ3119 07LAPAZ3261

Destination:

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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #3262/01 3482321

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O 142321Z DEC 07

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S E C R E T LA PAZ 003262

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2027

TAGS: ASEC, PREL, PGOV, PINL, VN, CU, BL

SUBJECT: MILITARY STANDDOWN MORE LIKELY THAN HEAVY HAND

REF: A. LA PAZ 3261

B. LA PAZ 3119

Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Summary: Over the past couple of days statements from

military leaders have taken a conciliatory tone and moved

away from the confrontational rhetoric from Armed Forces

Commander General Wilfredo Vargas. Vargas relayed a message

to the Ambassador that his troops would only intervene in

"Media Luna" opposition states if leaders clearly break with

the constitution, for example by declaring independence. The

Vice President echoed a similar message in a December 14

meeting when he told the Ambassador that the government is

not planning a state of siege or military action unless it is

required to defend government offices or protect the people.

Although the military is making plans to deploy 70 additional

companies to opposition-led departments (states), military

planners have told us that President Evo Morales has given

them instructions not to incur civilian casualties. Field

commanders continue to tell us they will require a written

order from President Morales if asked to commit violence

against opposition demonstrators. Even with such an order,

commanders are prepared to stand down and confine their

troops to barracks. Imposing a police state on rebel

departments presents several difficulties: the military views

this as strictly a police function; the military does not

presently have the supplies or logistics in place to conduct

such an operation; many key officers have ties with the

opposition departments in the Media Luna; and the military

knows based on past history that they will be held

accountable. An influential senator told us the opposition

is not nearly as concerned with military heavy handedness as

they are with altiplano police and mysterious "foreign"

fighters. End Summary.

Vargas: With Evo or Against Evo?

——————————–

2. (S)xxxxxxxxxxxx asked Military

Group Commander on December 13 to tell the Ambassador that in

case of confrontations in opposition-led "Media Luna"

departments (states), troops would be deployed in the same

manner as during the violent November 23-24 Sucre

demonstrations: troops would protect military and government

property, but would not enforce a crackdown on civilians.

This contradicted xxxxxxxxxxxx’ December 7 public statement that

"the true cowards are in the (opposition-controlled) Media

Luna" and that the military would "defend the homeland" in

Santa Cruz to ensure "the security of all." Although he

called for increased political dialogue, xxxxxxxxxxxx laid the

blame for any conflict in the future squarely with the

opposition for provoking and misinforming Bolivians, without

offering "any substantive solutions." But now xxxxxxxxxxxx has

changed his tune, saying he would only use the military to

quell civil disorder if the opposition acted in a clearly

unconstitutional way, for example by declaring independence.

He did not consider the proposal of autonomy statutes to be a

clear violation of the constitution. xxxxxxxxxxxx did stress,

however, that he would not tolerate insubordination or coup

plotting within his ranks. The Ambassador was also assured

by Vice President Garcia Linera on December 14 that the

government would not declare a state of siege or use the

military unless it needed to defend government offices or

protect people.

3. (S) That xxxxxxxxxxxx made his highly-political comments xxxxxxxxxxx angered many

commanders. Many commanders were also critical of xxxxxxxxxxx, as they feared it

opened the military to charges of taking political sides

beyond its institutional role.xxxxxxxxxxxx

4. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx had been,xxxxxxxxxxx a supporter

of U.S.-Bolivian military relations. Although he continues

to cooperate enthusiastically with us at a working level,

xxxxxxxxxxx his

public comments in the last few months have irritated

Bolivian military officers and raised eyebrows within the

Embassy. When given an opening to defend us regarding

conspiracy charges, he only said the charges should be

investigated. When given a chance to opine on Morales’

celebration of Che Guevara,s 1967 rebellion and criticism of

Bolivian troops, he said everyone has the right to their own

opinion.

Setting the Groundwork for Possible Military Action

——————————————— ——

5. (C) Government rhetoric calmed somewhat this week, with

officials including Morales making empty overtures about

dialogue and stressing that the opposition, not the

government, is pushing the country to conflict. But

government officials also warned that if dialogue failed and

opposition "sedition" continued, the government would have no

choice but to use force. "The state is disposed to use

institutions of force to preserve internal order and

democratic stability," said Government Minister Alfredo Rada.

Rada’s Vice-Minister Ruben Gamarra said the government would

not allow department or civic officials to "threaten the

unity of the country" as a matter of constitutional

obligation. Gamarra said the military also supports this

position. The Vice President also told the Ambassador that

"the president and I must guarantee the country’s integrity

and stability." The Ambassador made clear that the United

States supports a united and democratic Bolivia.

Military Leaders Stress Calm and Police Role

——————————————–

6. (C) On December 12, the military spoke for itself, backing

away from confrontational remarks. Minister of Defense

Walker San Miguel confirmed that the armed forces were on

alert, but said the motive was to protect public and private

property, not to quell unrest. San Miguel told the press the

police are responsible for maintaining civil order, not the

military. San Miguel discounted any possibility of declaring

a state of emergency in opposition departments and criticized

"paranoid" opposition leaders for asserting that President

Morales had ordered an imminent "militarization." (Note:

Opposition rumors include appointing military officers

temporarily to state and city civilian leadership positions.

End Note.) San Miguel explained although there had been no

troop mobilizations, the military remains "concerned." Army

Commander Freddy Bersatti said he hoped God would guide

opposition leaders to make good decisions "for the peace and

coexistence of all Bolivians."

Military to Retreat from Civilian Confrontations

——————————————— —

7. (C) Planning of troop deployments to opposition

departments was conducted December 7 and 8 and continued to

be refined this week. Participating commanders told us the

deployment would involve 70 companies. Army Chief of Staff

Gen. Freddy Mackay, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Daniel

Salazar, and Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Ernesto Roca are the

chief planners.

8. (S) A senior military planner told DAO December 13 that

President Morales wants the military to be careful to avoid

violent confrontations with demonstrators if called upon to

support Bolivian police. Despite public bravado, the planner

said Morales understands deaths will erode political support.

He confirmed some units have already deployed to key

locations throughout the Media Luna to secure gas lines,

public utilities, and government buildings. The planner said

the units would not be armed and would incorporate local

indigenous to minimize the potential for conflict. If the

opposition attempts to take these strategic locations by

force, the military would retreat.

Santa Chavez to Fund Bolivian Deployments

—————————————–

9. (S) Until recently, it was unclear how such a deployment

would be funded. However, military contacts said December 13

that $5 million became available this week to fund an

increased military presence in opposition-led departments and

another $1.3 million had been allocated for non-lethal

supplies, such as riot-control gas. The money was supposedly

freed up from Venezuelan sources, but this is not confirmed.

It will take time, at least two weeks, before the new funding

results in equipped troops on the ground in opposition

departments.

10. (C) Supply and logistics issues continue to be an

operational impediment to any proposed military crackdown,

and it may take months before the new funding resolves these

shortcomings at remote posts. Bolivia has not spent any

money on ammunition in two years, and the capacity to quickly

move troops remains in doubt. xxxxxxxxxxx told xxxxxxxxxxx he had

only two trucks and enough fuel to send his single plane on

one reconnaissance mission.

Venezuelan Cash and Foreign Fighters

————————————

11. (S) xxxxxxxxxxx said Morales understands he risks

losing the military if he pushes them into a police force

role. Because of this, he felt Morales would rely on the

police from the altiplano and "volunteers from other

countries" to combat opposition forces should an open

conflict develop. xxxxxxxxxxxx said Cuban hospitals could easily

be "converted to barracks," but had no idea how many

Venezuelan and Cubans would be willing or available to fight

for Evo’s government.

12. (S) Military contacts are concerned a few rogue

commanders might obey orders to enforce a police state, their

loyalty greased with Venezuelan pay-offs. They asserted

Venezuelan money would also make it difficult for the

high-command to refuse such orders. Although Venezuelan

"bonuses" have cemented some loyalty, it has also created

much resentment in the mid- and lower-ranks and cost the high

command significant legitimacy. According xxxxxxxxxxx and field

commanders, there is also a high degree of frustration with

the perceived meddling of Venezuelan advisors in the internal

functions of the military and of overtly political statements

and actions of the high command (such as Army Commander

Bersatti’s decision to wear a red poncho in solidarity with

the violent, pro-government Red Ponchos group a year ago).

Mixed Signals on Holiday Troop Strength

—————————————

13. (C) Although planning and funding appear to be in place,

the military was sending out mixed signals as to its

intentions. There has been no order to extend assignments or

cancel leave, as would be expected prior to a major military

undertaking. About 70 percent of the army’s conscript force

will be rotating during the first two weeks of January.

Allowing inexperienced troops to transfer into the bulk of

Media Luna enlisted positions, rather than keeping its

existing troops in place, might signal that the government

does not anticipate a major conflict in the near-future.

However, a senior military planner told DATT that keeping the

conscripts from rotating would be "more trouble than it is

worth" and that new troops would be more motivated. He also

anticipated an order canceling leave before December 19.

Another potential tripwire: graduations at the military

academy in Cochabamba Department were moved up four days to

December 12.

Field Commanders Set to Stand Down

———————————-

14. (S) Although xxxxxxxxxxx and others in the high command may be

coy, many field commanders continue to tell us they will not

participate in violence against opposition demonstrations.

xxxxxxxxxxx was on hand when a high-ranking civil defense

officer told the commander in Tarija Department to demand a

written order from President Morales if asked to take action

against opposition leaders or demonstrators. If they

received such an order, the officer advised non-compliance

and a post lock down to commanders from Cochabamba, Santa

Cruz, and Tarija. The civil defense officer told MILGP

Commander he expects commanders will not use force.

15. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told Emboff that

Minister of Government Rada contacted the Navy leadership

when violent protests broke out in Cobija, Pando on November

30 and asked the Navy to step in and enforce order (Note:

the Navy is the strongest military branch in the department

of Pando). Navy commanders said they would comply when

provided a signed order from Morales. Rada never called

back. xxxxxxxxxxxx told PolOffs the air force in

Cobija was similarly requested to take control of the

civilian airport, requested a written order, and never got

one.

X-Factors: Institutionalism, Regionalism, and Wives

——————————————— ——

16. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told us despite government and high-command

rhetoric about the military’s "constitutional role," most

commanders thought the government violated the law and the

constitution by excluding the opposition from key sessions of

Congress and the Constituent Assembly and, therefore, "have

no right to invoke the constitution." A strong commitment to

institutionalism would require a rock-solid constitutional

argument before commanders would participate in any action

that could be considered "political."

17. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx said commanders ultimately place loyalty to

their region above all other considerations. Although most

commanders are originally from the altiplano, they have spent

most of their careers stationed in the Media Luna. He said

many officers worked with the same opposition leaders the

government might call on them to unseat, a prospect he found

"very unlikely." Many altiplano officers marry in the Media

Luna and have family there. As for the large minority of

officers from the Media Luna, including himself, Suarez said

there is "no way any of us are going to attack our own

people." Rather, he said, they would side with the

opposition if forced to take sides.

xxxxxxxxxxx "Divided" Military Won,t Intervene

——————————————— —-

18. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx told PolOff

December 14 the opposition did not believe the "divided"

military would repress them, but were more concerned about

irregular pro-government militias organized and financed by

Venezuelans and Cubans. xxxxxxxxxxx, however, provided no details

on the supposed paramilitary organizations. xxxxxxxxxxxx said, in

any event, he expected no violent stand-off with the

government before January as both sides are "disorganized."

Comment:

——–

19. (C) The best the government can hope for if it gives the

order to bust opposition heads is sporadic and half-hearted

compliance from a minority of commanders. Although they can

be expected to protect government infrastructure and

transportation, most commanders are likely to sit out any

violent confrontation with opposition forces. Consistent

with out November assessment (Reftel B), we continue to

believe the military will choose to ignore orders that are

not solidly linked to their constitutional role, in writing,

or that requires them to spill Bolivian blood.

20. (C) Despite bravado from field commanders, DAO expects

them to frame any potential insubordination as "selective

non-compliance" to their superiors. Although field

commanders may be anxious about day after scenarios if they

disobey orders, it would be difficult for the government to

replace "insubordinate" officers, particularly if officers

refused such orders en masse. It is unlikely the government

would find more loyal commanders in the lower ranks,

uncertain if rank and file troops would recognize them, and

unclear if such an overly political reorganization would be

tolerated by the high command. Unlike his erstwhile ally

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Evo does not have a network

of personal friends within the military (although his

Presidency Minister Juan Quintana does), and the military is

leery of taking on any role considered remotely political.

The military fears above all a repeat of the bloody

military-civilian conflicts in El Alto in 2003, which brought

down the Goni government. Many commanders are still bitter

about the fallout from those events and believe the military

took the risks and the blame for political decisions.

21. (C) xxxxxxxxxxx remains an enigma. Some commanders suspected,

at least xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, that he might be

sympathetic to a coup. He is widely characterized as an

"opportunist" xxxxxxxxxxx. Under intense pressure from both political sides,

he plays both sides. We cannot expect him to stand behind

his assurances. End Comment.

GOLDBERG

elpais.com