El Departamento de Estado de los EEUU acaba de divulgar su reporte anual sobre narcotráfico en el mundo, donde se incluyen serias observaciones sobre la lucha antidrogas en Bolivia. El reporte señala que “La capacidad del gobierno de Bolivia para identificar, investigar y desmantelar a las organizaciones de tráfico de drogas se mantiene considerablemente disminuida tras la expulsión de la Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) en enero de 2009”. También indica que “Las organizaciones de narcotraficantes, incluidas las de México y Colombia, siguen aumentando su presencia en el país”.
Reporte completo sobre Bolivia
A. Introduction
Bolivia is the world’s third largest cocaine producer and a significant transit zone for Peruvian-origin cocaine. Bolivia also produces marijuana, primarily for domestic consumption. Existing reports indicate that most Bolivian-origin cocaine flows to other Latin American countries, especially Brazil, for domestic consumption or onward transit towards Europe, with little exported to the United States.
On September 15, 2010, the President of the United States determined for the third consecutive year that the Government of Bolivia (GOB) “failed demonstrably” to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under counternarcotics (CN) conventions. The President found that, despite exceeding minimum eradication goals and continued narcotic and precursor seizures, the GOB’s total effort fell short of its international obligations. Coca cultivation increased 36 percent to 35,000 hectares, from 2006 to 2009. Potential pure cocaine production increased 70 percent during the period. In 2009, the GOB did not achieve a net reduction in the cultivation of coca or the production of cocaine, maintained inadequate controls over licit coca markets to prevent diversion to illicit narcotic production, did not close illicit coca markets, and failed to develop and execute a national drug strategy consistent with international conventions.
The National Drug Control Council (CONALTID) is the GOB’s central CN policymaking body. The Vice Ministry for Social Defense (VMSD) is mandated to combat drug trafficking, regulate coca production, and advance coca eradication and drug prevention and rehabilitation activities. The Special Counternarcotics Police Force (FELCN) under the Bolivian National Police (BNP) comprises approximately 1,500 personnel and reports to the VMSD. FELCN works with CN Prosecutors within the Attorney General’s Office on drug-related crimes. The Joint Eradication Task Force (JTF), approximately 2,000 military, police and civilian personnel, conducts coca eradication in cooperation with the Directorate General for Integral Development of Coca Producing Regions (DIGPROCOCA), which supervises and verifies coca eradication by measuring the fields before and after coca eradication.
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Bolivian President Evo Morales is also president of the coca growers’ federation in the Chapare region of Bolivia, one of the two major coca-growing areas. In 2010, the GOB continued efforts to amend the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs by removing references to coca leaf chewing. The GOB also remained committed to passing legislation raising the legal number of hectares of coca cultivation from 12,000 to 20,000 hectares. The Morales Administration maintained its “social control” policy for illicit coca eradication in which the GOB negotiates with coca growers to obtain their consent for eradication. In 2010, eradication forces met resistance from coca growers, including large protests, road blockades, and stone throwing, forcing the GOB to temporarily withdraw eradication forces from Palos Blancos and Carrasco National Park.
The GOB’s ability to identify, investigate and dismantle drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and follow actionable law enforcement leads developed in Bolivia remains considerably diminished following its expulsion of all Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel from Bolivia in January 2009. The United States has no information on priority target DTOs that were dismantled in Bolivia in 2010 and GOB CN officials state that DTOs, including from Mexico and Colombia, continue to increase their presence in country. Bolivia is a signatory to the 1988 United Nations (UN) Drug Convention.
B. Drug Control Accomplishments, Policies, and Trends
1. Institutional Development
Although committed to increasing legal coca levels, the GOB announced it would delay legislation until mid-2011, pending the results of a European Union-funded study on traditional coca consumption. The study was supposed to have been launched in 2004 with results ready in 2005, but was delayed for many reasons, including attempts by the GOB to expand the terms of reference to include potential commercialization of coca leaf. In September 2010, the GOB passed legislation intended to enhance regulation over coca leaf sales by restricting the amount of coca leaf that can be sold to five pounds per coca grower per month. However, the GOB then repealed the regulation in part due to public protests and road blockades. President Morales, in a speech to coca growers in the Chapare in October 2010, publicly acknowledged the diversion of Bolivian coca to drug production and requested coca growers to help contain coca production.
In 2010, the GOB prepared wiretaps, money laundering and asset forfeiture legislation to replace existing laws, drawing on technical assistance provided by the United States Government (USG) in 2008, as well as regional partners, especially Colombia and Chile. The bills await approval from the Ministry of Government prior to submission to the Bolivian Congress.
FELCN added a Special Cases Investigative Group (GICE) to handle CN investigations and an Information and Intelligence Generating Center (CIGEIN) to expand regional information sharing in 2010. FELCN also plans to update communications across the country to include scanner-equipped vehicles and satellite communications equipment. FELCN’s Director General stated operations focused on high-level traffickers in the Santa Cruz Department by working with counterparts from neighboring countries and attacking traffickers’ financial assets. The GOB reported that CIGEIN achieved its first investigative success in October 2010 in a multi-million dollar money laundering case in Santa Cruz involving a high-ranking BNP officer. However, the disposition of any assets seized was not verified due to the absence of DEA personnel.
The GOB increased its national eradication program by funding CN efforts through GOB resources. The Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) provides logistics and administrative support for Bolivian counternarcotics operations, including manual eradication.
The Morales Administration sought counternarcotics support from other countries and received training and information-sharing from Brazil, along with continued law enforcement cooperation with Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In October 2010, Bolivia and Brazil held their third high-level bilateral meeting under a law enforcement cooperation agreement.
Agreements and Treaties. Bolivia is a signatory to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Bolivia is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling, the UN Convention against Corruption, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Bolivia lacks many of the legal and enforcement mechanisms necessary to fully implement these agreements. Bolivia signed, but has not yet ratified, the Inter-American Convention on Extradition. The Inter –American Convention on Mutual Assistance to Criminal Matters was ratified, but not yet signed.
The GOB and the United States signed a bilateral extradition treaty in 1995, which entered into force in 1996. The treaty permits the extradition of nationals for most serious offenses, including drug trafficking. The United States has one pending extradition request to Bolivia as of December 2009.
2. Supply Reduction
Overall coca cultivation increased ten percent in 2009 to 35,000 hectares according to official USG estimates, up from 32,000 hectares in 2008.
President Morales set a 2010 coca eradication goal of 8,000 hectares. The GOB reported eradication of 8,200 hectares of coca in 2010 – 79.2 percent (6,493 hectares) in the Chapare, 4.6 percent (377 hectares) in Yapacani, and 16.2 percent (1,330 hectares) in the Yungas. The GOB reported increased annual eradication over 2009 results (6,341 hectares), in part due to increased eradication in the Yungas. The GOB increased national expenditures for additional eradicators and new eradication camps in the Yungas, Alto Beni in La Paz District, and in Carrasco and Isiboro Secure National Parks. Despite increasing coca leaf eradication to 8,200 hectares in 2010, due to new coca planting in many locations in Bolivia, a net reduction in coca cultivation is not anticipated.
The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Integrated Alternative Development (IAD) program provides support to help diversify the economies of Bolivia’s coca growing regions, reduce communities’ dependency on coca, and complement the GOB’s coca eradication program. IAD assistance helps increase Bolivian farmers’ income by improving the quality and competitiveness of their products in national and world markets. The program also improves families’ access to basic social services and to markets, including improvements to rural road infrastructure. USAID provides assistance in communities selected jointly with the GOB and focuses in the Yungas coca-growing area of La Paz Department. In Fiscal Year 2010, assistance provided to farm communities and businesses helped generate nearly 2,300 new jobs and $13.4 million in sales of IAD products. In total, approximately 15,000 families benefited directly from U.S. Alternative Development assistance.
The USG estimates that potential pure cocaine production increased approximately 70 percent, from 115 metric tons (MT) in 2006 to 195 MT in 2008 and remained at 195 MT in 2009. While the lack of DEA or other international law enforcement working with FELCN in the field on a daily basis makes it difficult to independently verify the accuracy of figures reported by the GOB, according to the GOB, FELCN seized 1,016 MT of coca leaf, 25.71 MT of cocaine base and 3.38 MT of cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) in 2010. FELCN also located and destroyed 24 mega-sized cocaine HCl processing labs, 19 small and mid-sized processing labs, and 7,948 maceration pits. This represents an increase over calendar year 2009 levels. FELCN reports, however, that drug lab raids frequently fail to find and seize drugs or to result in significant arrests and that some labs are found abandoned, suggesting corruption and poor operational security. In addition, FELCN reported that it seized approximately 1,073.33 MT of marijuana, 963.82 MT of solid precursor chemicals, and 2,400,270.65 liters of liquid precursors.
The type of drug labs and chemicals seized suggest the prevalence of Colombian-style cocaine processing methods over traditional maceration pits and the increasing presence of Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers in Bolivia. Unofficially, FELCN officers believe rising violence and drug turf wars in Bolivia are linked to foreign DTOs.
FELCN reports it increased efforts to interdict narcotics air and road shipments and those occurring along Bolivia’s borders. FELCN believes that most narcotics cross Bolivian borders in shipping containers or as cargo in small aircraft. Countries bordering Bolivia continue to experience increased drug trafficking from Bolivia, especially Brazil, and report seizures of Bolivian drugs and arrests of drug traffickers linked to Bolivia.
The GOB arrested and charged 3,735 persons on narcotics-related offenses in 2010. This arrest rate was about 10 percent more per month than in 2009. Internal GOB reviews of the statistical conviction rates by the Public Ministry and a survey conducted by the National Fiscal Training Facility in Sucre indicate that CN prosecutions continue to be backlogged. For example, fewer than 8 percent of cases brought in 2009 resulted in convictions.
3. Drug Abuse Awareness, Demand Reduction, and Treatment
The GOB is reluctant to accept indications of increased cocaine and marijuana consumption in Bolivia. The Latin American Center of Scientific Investigation (CELIN) study entitled “Drug Use in Bolivia 1992-2010” showed a steady increase in drug use throughout the country. Urban marijuana consumers increased from 0.2 percent in 1992 to 2.54 percent per capita in 2010; cocaine HCl consumers rose from 0.1 percent in 1992 to 1.59 percent in 2010; and cocaine base users grew from 0.2 percent in 1992 to 1.44 percent in 2010. Seventy-five percent of Bolivians surveyed view drug use as a major problem. More than 70 percent of Bolivians also believe that illegal drugs are easily available in their communities.
FELCN sponsored a media campaign to educate communities on the dangers of drug abuse, however, the Ministry of Health and Sports, which has the lead on drug prevention and treatment programs in Bolivia, did not take steps to increase public awareness of drug abuse in 2010.
4. Corruption
The GOB enacted an Anti-Corruption Law on March 31, 2010, which applies to all public officials and may be applied retroactively with no statute of limitations. The law does not specifically refer to narcotics-related corruption. Through October 2010, GOB prosecutors continued to bring corruption charges under the existing criminal code rather than the new law.
The GOB does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking. There are no proven cases of senior GOB officials encouraging or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. Incidents of corruption among FELCN officers increased since the departure of DEA in 2009, but the FELCN Director General launched an initiative to deter corruption that includes polygraph exams for all of its officers. Of the more than 500 FELCN officers polygraphed in 2010, 93 officers failed the exam and were removed from FELCN. Twenty additional officers who failed the polygraph were placed on administrative duties, pending removal.
The BNP has two Offices of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for internal investigations – one for FELCN and one for the remainder of the BNP – that are expected to merge in January 2011. The BNP OPR investigates all cases and may sanction law enforcement for minor infractions. The BNP’s Disciplinary Tribunal is responsible for reviewing cases and determining punishment, if appropriate, for police officers involved in misconduct and other integrity-related violations. Cases involving violation of Bolivian law are referred to the Public Ministry for Prosecution. The BNP reports that the OPRs investigated 2,693 allegations of misconduct involving police officers and 1,311 investigations (involving one or more than one officer) were pending during 2010. The FELCN OPR received 163 new allegations against FELCN officers and fired one officer, imposed internal sanctions on 15 officers, dropped cases against 56 officers due to lack of foundation, referred 23 officers to the Disciplinary Tribunal and continued to investigate cases involving 58 officers.
C. National Goals, Bilateral Cooperation, and U.S. Policy Initiatives
USG programs seek to enhance the capabilities of the GOB to reduce coca cultivation; arrest and bring traffickers to justice; promote integrated alternative development; disrupt the production of cocaine within Bolivia; interdict and destroy illicit drugs and precursor chemicals moving within and through the country; reduce domestic abuse of cocaine and other illicit drugs; institutionalize a professional law enforcement system; and improve the Bolivian population’s awareness of the dangers of illicit drugs. To achieve these aims, the USG continues to provide administrative, logistical, financial and training support to Bolivian CN programs and to work productively with the GOB at the policy implementation and technical level.
In 2010, the USG provided administrative support for anti-corruption training and polygraph examinations for the BNP’s OPR and the BNP’s Disciplinary Tribunal to combat corruption within FELCN and CN Prosecutors. The USG also supported the training of 9,012 police officers, prosecutors, and other GOB and non-governmental organization (NGO) officials — 60 percent more than in 2009. The USG also supported 112 training courses, seminars and conferences — 90 percent more than in 2009. Support included training for Bolivian police officers in Peru, Colombia, Argentina and Chile, as well as USG-sponsored instructors from Colombia and Brazil delivering courses in Bolivia.
During 2010, the USG supported eight drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation projects. The USG and UNODC implemented a drug abuse prevention program in El Alto which focused on children between eight and eighteen-years-old and reached more than 60,000 participants. The USG funded the NGO Communication, Research and Action in Social Policies to produce drug abuse prevention manuals for teachers, social workers and parents, as well as audiovisual and printed working aids for high school students. The USG worked with the Ministry of Health and Sports to sponsor two training courses for counselors from rehabilitation centers affiliated with the Therapeutic Communities Bolivian Association (TCBA). These courses were specifically designed to improve the quality of service at 38 Bolivian drug rehabilitation centers.
D. Conclusion
The GOB took steps to improve its counternarcotics performance in 2010, but did not gain significant ground against illegal coca cultivation and drug traffickers. While President Evo Morales publicly challenged his Chapare coca grower political constituency to stay within the bounds of coca production that the GOB permitted, a new law will likely recognize an additional 8,000 more legal hectares of coca cultivation – bringing the total to 20,000 hectares. It is anticipated to be delayed at least until mid-2011, but its implementation will violate international agreements to which Bolivia is a signatory.
The GOB is encouraged to strengthen its efforts to achieve tighter controls over the trade in coca leaf to stem the diversion of coca leaf to cocaine processing, in line with international treaties; protect its citizens from the deleterious effects of drugs, corruption, and drug trafficking; achieve net reductions in coca cultivation; and keep pace with replanting.
For the near term, drug traffickers, including those from Colombia and Mexico, will continue to exploit opportunities to process abundant coca leaf into cocaine base and cocaine HCl. To diminish Bolivia’s appeal to drug traffickers, further GOB action is required to improve the legal and regulatory environment for security and justice sector efforts to effectively and efficiently combat drug production and trafficking, money laundering, corruption, and other transnational crime, and bring criminal enterprises to justice through the rule of law. Concerns about the challenge to Bolivian institutions from drug traffickers and corruption may drive the GOB’s increased resource commitment to these efforts. If Bolivia devotes more of its own resources to counternarcotics, it will become more vested in obtaining results. The GOB agreed in 2009 to nationalize some of the assistance the USG previously provided. Enacting new asset forfeiture legislation and other CN measures would provide Bolivian law enforcement agencies with additional resources in a constrained budget environment. Even with the GOB funding more of its CN effort, it will not have sufficient resources to win the fight. Members of the international community most directly affected by Bolivian cocaine exports are encouraged to share more responsibility and increase their support to Bolivia.